
The Iranian state-sponsored hacking group known as MuddyWater (also as Mango Sandstorm, Seedworm, and Static Kitten) has been implicated in a “false flag” ransomware attack, according to a report from Rapid7. This incident, observed in early 2026, shows increasing sophistication and an attempt to blur attribution by adopting cybercrime tactics.
False Flag Attack and Sophisticated Tactics
The initial attack appeared consistent with a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group operating under the Chaos brand. However, evidence suggests this is a state-backed targeted attack disguised as opportunistic extortion.
Rapid7 highlighted that the campaign was characterized by a “high-touch” social engineering phase through Microsoft Teams. The attackers used interactive screen sharing sessions to:
- Collect credentials.
- Manipulate multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Once inside, the group bypassed traditional ransomware workflows, forgoing file encryption in favor of data exfiltration and establishing long-term persistence using remote management tools like DWAgent.
MuddyWater and the Obscuration of Attribution
The findings indicate an effort by MuddyWater to “muddy” attribution, using increasingly tools available on the cybercrime black market. This change has been documented by several security firms, which have noted the use of tools such as CastleRAT and Tsundere.
This is not the first time MuddyWater has carried out ransomware attacks. In September 2020, they were credited with a campaign against Israeli organizations using the PowGoop loader to deploy a destructive variant of Thanos ransomware. In 2023, Microsoft revealed that the group partnered with DEV-1084 (known as DarkBit) for destructive attacks under the guise of ransomware. More recently, in October 2025, they are believed to have used Qilin ransomware against an Israeli government hospital.
Check Point noted in March that these attackers are likely “Iran-affiliated operators working across the cybercriminal ecosystem, using a brand of criminal ransomware and methods associated with the extortion market, while serving an Iranian strategic objective.”
The Chaos RaaS Group
Chaos is a RaaS group that emerged in early 2025, known for its double extortion model and advertising its affiliate program on underground forums such as RAMP and RehubCom.
Chaos attacks use a combination of:
- Mail flooding and vishing: Through Teams, often impersonating IT support staff.
- Remote Access Tools Deployment: Such as Microsoft Quick Assist, to get an initial foothold.
Rapid7 also noted that Chaos has demonstrated triple extortion (threats of DDoS attacks) and even quadruple extortion (threats to contact customers or competitors).
Technical Details of the Intrusion
In the intrusion analyzed by Rapid7, MuddyWater/Chaos initiated external chat requests through Teams to interact with employees and gain initial access through screen sharing sessions. After the compromise, they used compromised user accounts to:
- Perform reconnaissance.
- Establish persistence with DWAgent and AnyDesk.
- Move laterally.
- Exfiltrate data.
Rescue negotiations were subsequently conducted via email. The attackers ran basic discovery commands, accessed VPN configuration files, and instructed users to enter their credentials into local text files. They also deployed AnyDesk for easy access.
Observed using RDP to download an executable (ms_upd.exe) from an external server (172.86.126[.]208) using the curl utility, which started a multiphase infection chain:
ms_upd.exe(aka Stagecomp): Collects system information and communicates with a command and control (C2) server to download next stage payloads (game.exe,WebView2Loader.dllandvisualwincomp.txt).game.exe(aka Darkcomp): A custom remote access trojan (RAT) that disguises itself as a legitimate Microsoft WebView2 application, being a trojanized version of the officialMicrosoft WebView2APISampleproject.WebView2Loader.dll: A legitimate DLL downloaded byms_upd.exe, required for embedding web content in Windows applications.visualwincomp.txt: An encrypted configuration used by the RAT to obtain information from the C2.
The RAT connects to the C2 server and polls new commands every 60 seconds, allowing the execution of PowerShell commands or scripts, file operations, and the creation of an interactive cmd.exe or PowerShell shell.
Links with MuddyWater
The attribution to MuddyWater is derived from the use of a code signing certificate associated with “Donald Gay” to sign ms_upd.exe. This certificate has previously been used by the group to sign their malware, including a CastleLoader downloader called Fakeset.
Other Iranian Nexus Attacks
This development coincides with other reports on Iranian operations:
- Hunt.io: Revealed an Iranian nexus operation targeting Omani government institutions, exfiltrating over 26,000 Ministry of Justice user records, court case data, and SAM and SYSTEM registry hives. An open directory was found at
172.86.76[.]127. - Handala Hack: A pro-Iran hacktivist group that claims to have published details of nearly 400 US Navy service members in the Persian Gulf and to have attacked the Port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates, exfiltrating some 11,000 sensitive documents.
Sergey Shykevich of Check Point Research warned of the escalation of Iranian cyber operations and the explicit connection between the cyber and kinetic domains, suggesting that stolen port infrastructure data could be used for physical missile targeting.
Conclusions
The growing convergence between state-sponsored intrusion activity and cybercrime tactics, such as the use of RaaS frameworks, allows actors like MuddyWater to blur distinctions and complicate attribution. This diverts defense efforts toward the immediate impact, delaying the identification of underlying persistence mechanisms. The absence of file encryption, despite ransomware artifacts, suggests that the ransomware component primarily serves as a facilitation or obfuscation mechanism, rather than being the primary target of the intrusion.
Confidence
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References
Original source: See original article
*Rapid7
- The Hacker News
- Ctrl-Alt-Intel *Broadcom *Check Point
- JUMPSEC *Hunt.io *Microsoft Teams *Microsoft Quick Assist
- DWAgent
- AnyDesk
- IP: 172.86.126[.]208
- IP: 172.86.76[.]127
- Code Signing Certificate: Donald Gay